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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Scott D. Steel went to trial on one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for
slamming a knife into the counter at his local bar. The district court imposed a twenty-year
sentence, with ten years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Steel argues the district court abused its discretion
at trial by admitting an overly prejudicial video of him restrained in the back of a police car.
Mr. Steel also argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence
and by denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion. Due to the trial error, Mr. Steel
respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new
trial. As for the sentencing errors, he respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence or,
alternatively, vacate his judgment of conviction or the district court’s denial of his Rule 35
motion and remand for a new sentencing or Rule 35 motion hearing.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Steel with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for sticking a
knife into a bar’s counter in front of the bartender, Jessica Silva. (R., pp.27–28.) Mr. Steel pled
not guilty and went to trial. (R., p.37.)
Before opening statements, and outside the presence of the jury, Mr. Steel objected to the
State’s use of Officer Silvester’s bodycam video of him in the back of a police car after his
arrest. (Tr. Vol. I,1 p.95, L.16–p.96, L.4.) This video showed him leaning slightly forward in the
car with his hands hidden behind his back. (Tr. Vol. I, p.95, Ls.20–25; see also State’s Ex. 103.)
Instead of this video, Mr. Steel requested the State use Officer Cyr’s bodycam video, which
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pointed out towards the car’s front windshield, rather than towards Mr. Steel. (Tr. Vol. I, p.96,
Ls.1–4.) The district court took the matter under advisement and planned to view the video
during a break in the trial. (Tr. Vol. I, p.97, Ls.7–18.)
During the next recess, the district court revisited Mr. Steel’s objection to the video. (See
Tr. Vol. I, p.139, L.4–p.148, L.19.) The district court was unable to view the video due to
technical difficulties. (Tr. Vol. I, p.139, Ls.11–13.) Mr. Steel reiterated his objection because the
video depicted him in restraints in the back of the police car. (Tr. Vol. I, p.143, L.18–p.144, L.1.)
Mr. Steel also repeated he had no objection to Officer Cyr’s video as an alternative. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.139, Ls.14–19.) As another option, Mr. Steel requested the district court play only the audio of
Officer Silvester’s video. (Tr. Vol. I, p.146, Ls.5–6.) In response, the State argued Mr. Steel’s
demeanor and facial expressions were relevant to interpret his statements and his intent during
the incident. (Tr. Vol. I, p.142, L.25–p.143, L.7.) The district court overruled Mr. Steel’s
objection. (Tr. Vol. I, p.148, Ls.17–19.) The district court reasoned, because the handcuffs were
not visible, the video was not overly prejudicial. (Tr. Vol. I, p.147, Ls.4–12.)
The State’s evidence generally showed Mr. Steel walked into the bar, slammed a knife
into the counter by Jessica, commented to the bartender and other customers, pulled his knife out
of the counter, and then left the bar. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.123, L.3–p.126, L.13, p.133, L.15–p.137,
L.1, p.164, Ls.1–24, p.165, Ls.9–15, p.173, L.2–p.174, L.22, p.185, L.3–p.187, L.22, p.194,
L.18–p.198, L.1.) At the time of this incident, Mr. Steel was in a relationship with Jessica’s
mother. (Tr. Vol. I, p.169, Ls.1–2.) Jessica’s mother also worked at the bar, and Mr. Steel was a
regular customer. (Tr. Vol. I, p.168, Ls.23–25, p.169, Ls.17–18.) Jessica had recently kicked
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There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains day one of the jury
trial. The second, cited as Volume II, contains day two of the jury trial. The third, cited as
Volume II, contains the sentencing hearing.
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Mr. Steel out of the bar because she had argued with her mother about their relationship. (See
Tr. Vol. I, p.169, L.5–p.171, L.17.) When Mr. Steel stuck the knife down, Jessica testified he
commented, “Well, you’ll take my money and buy beers for the bar.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.173, Ls.12–
13.) She also testified he asked her to serve him, she told him to leave, and he said, “You and
who else is going to make me in this bar?” (Tr. Vol. I, p.177, Ls.15–17.) She described him as
having a “cold, hard stare,” and she said she was very scared by the incident. (Tr. Vol. I, p.173,
Ls.14–16, p.174, L.25–p.176, L.1.)
Through Officer Silvester’s testimony, the State offered his bodycam video as State’s
Exhibit 103. (Tr. Vol. I, p.209, L.23–p.210, L.13.) Officer Silvester testified he found Mr. Steel
in an alleyway after Jessica called 911. (Tr. Vol. I, p.175, L.8, p.209, Ls.1–10.) He explained, “I
stopped him there in the alleyway to ask him some questions and eventually arrested him.”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.209, Ls.15–16.) The district court admitted State’s Exhibit 103, and the prosecutor
published it to the jury. (Tr. Vol. I, p.210, L.14–p.211, L.23.)
In his defense, Mr. Steel explained he was not trying to scare anyone and he never
intended to hurt anyone. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.112, L.4–p.114, L.5; Tr. Vol. II, p.274, L.2–p.285,
L.6.) He just wanted people to leave him and his girlfriend alone. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.113, Ls.14–
25; Tr. Vol. II, p.284, Ls.5–9.)
The jury found Mr. Steel guilty as charged. (Tr. Vol. II, p.296, L.18–p.297, L.12;
R., p.114.) The district court sentenced Mr. Steel to twenty years, with ten years fixed. (Tr. Vol.
III, p.31, L.22–p.32, L.1; R., p.119.) Mr. Steel timely appealed from the district court’s judgment
of conviction. (R., pp.119–21, 124–27.)
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Mr. Steel then filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction in his sentence. (Aug.
R., pp.1–2.) He requested the district court reduce his fixed time to eight years. (Aug. R., p.1.)
The district court denied his motion. (Aug. R., pp.9–11.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting an overly prejudicial video of
Mr. Steel in the back of a police car?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr. Steel to twenty years, with
ten years fixed, for aggravated assault with a knife?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Steel’s Rule 35 motion for a
reduction in his fixed time?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting An Overly Prejudicial Video Of
Mr. Steel In The Back Of A Police Car
A.

Introduction
Mr. Steel argues the district court did not apply the correct evidentiary standards and

therefore abused its discretion by admitting Officer Silvester’s bodycam video of him in the back
of a police car. Specifically, he argues the danger of unfair prejudice due to the jury seeing him
restrained in the back of the police car outweighed the video’s probative value. The district court
should have admitted the audio of Officer Silvester’s video or Officer Cyr’s alternative video
that did not show Mr. Steel in the police car to avoid the prejudicial effect on the jury. The
district court’s evidentiary error in admitting Officer Silvester’s video was an abuse of discretion,
and the State will be unable to show this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews questions regarding the admissibility of evidence using a
mixed standard of review. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143 (2008). First,
whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to free review.
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569 (2007). Second, [the Court] review[s] the
district court’s determination of whether the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion. Stevens, 146 Idaho at
143.

State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907 (2015). To determine whether the district court abused its
discretion, the Court considers three factors: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue
as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently within the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason.” Id.
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C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently Within The Evidentiary Standards By
Admitting A Video Of Mr. Steel In The Back Of The Police Car Because The Danger Of
Unfair Prejudice Substantially Outweighed The Video’s Probative Value
Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Idaho Rule of Evidence (“I.R.E.”) 402.

“Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”’ State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2007) (quoting I.R.E. 401).
Relevant evidence must be excluded, however, “if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” I.R.E. 403.
“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an improper basis.” State v.
Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2011).
Here, Mr. Steel asserts Officer Silvester’s bodycam video of him in the back of the police
car with his hands behind his back was prejudicial. Although not the same as the jury’s
observation of a defendant in shackles or handcuffs at trial, the jury’s observation of the
defendant in a restrained condition before trial carries similar risks. The prejudicial effect of
restraints in the courtroom may have “a significant effect on the jury’s feelings about the
defendant.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970). Restraints at trial have “an adverse effect
upon the presumption of innocence.” State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 96 (1978). Again, while
not identical, the jury’s observation of a defendant restrained in the back of a police car
influences the jury’s feelings about the defendant. It informs the jury that the defendant was
uncooperative (due to the restraints) and went to jail for the alleged offense, which indicates
guilt. As such, Mr. Steel submits the video of him in the police car was prejudicial.
Moreover, Mr. Steel argues a video is far more prejudicial than the jury hearing
testimony on the defendant’s arrest. In many cases, as was the case here, the jury will hear from
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a police officer that he arrested the defendant. (Tr. Vol. I, p.209, Ls.15–16.) However, a minute
or so of testimony on the defendant’s arrest is much less inflammatory than a video where the
jury can see the defendant restrained by the police for an extended time. A video is more
memorable, and it gives the jury an image of a guilty person. The video here gave the jury that
image, especially when compared to Officer Silvester’s single statement on the arrest. (See
Tr. Vol. I, p.209, L.16.) The video thus carried a danger of unfair prejudice.
This danger of unfair prejudice from the video outweighed its probative value. The
prosecutor sought to admit this video so the jury could observe Mr. Steel’s facial expressions and
demeanor when making statements to Officer Silvester. (Tr. Vol. I, p.143, Ls.1–7.) But, the
jury’s ability to see Mr. Steel’s face and body language did not add enough probative value to
outweigh the video’s prejudicial effect. In the other bodycam video from Officer Cyr (which
Mr. Steel did not object to), the jury could not see Mr. Steel, but they could hear his statements.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.139, L.14–p.140, L.1.) The jury could have gained sufficient information from
Mr. Steel’s tone and voice inflection from Officer Cyr’s video or the audio of Officer Silvester’s
video. Observations of Mr. Steel’s facial expressions and demeanor were unnecessary in light of
the video’s prejudicial impact. Further, Mr. Steel’s demeanor had very little probative value. Due
to his restraints, there was not much demeanor to see. Any probative value in Officer Silvester’s
video, as compared to Officer Cyr’s video or Officer Silvester’s audio, did not outweigh the
danger of unfair prejudice from the jury seeing Mr. Steel arrested in the back of a police car.
Accordingly, the district court did not apply the correct evidentiary standards by
admitting this video. “[T]he availability of alternative evidence is a factor to be considered by the
trial court in exercising its discretion under [I.R.E.] 403.” State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656
(Ct. App. 1993). The district court did not adequately consider the video’s prejudicial effect or
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properly weigh it against the alternative video. The video’s probative value did not outweigh the
danger of unfair prejudice to Mr. Steel, and the district court should have excluded the video in
light of the alternatives.
Finally, the State will be unable to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, the district
court’s abuse of discretion in admitting this prejudicial evidence was harmless. The State has the
burden to prove the admission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013). “To meet that burden, the State must ‘prove[ ] beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”’ Id. (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010)).
This Court’s inquiry “is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict
would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial
was surely unattributable to the error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). Here,
the State will not meet its burden because the video had an adverse effect on Mr. Steel’s
presumption of innocence. This evidentiary error was not harmless, and Mr. Steel respectfully
requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Sentencing Mr. Steel To Twenty Years, With Ten
Years Fixed, For Aggravated Assault With A Knife
A.

Introduction
Mr. Steel argues the district court failed to exercise reason and therefore abused its

discretion by imposing an excessive sentence for the instant offense.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The district court’s sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 468 (2017). Mr. Steel respectfully refers this Court to Part I.B for the
three-part standard for appellate review of discretionary decisions.

C.

The District Court Did Not Exercise Reason By Sentencing Mr. Steel To Ten Years
Fixed Plus Ten Years Indeterminate For Slamming A Knife Into A Bar
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has

the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Steel’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. §§ 18-906 (five year maximum for aggravated assault), 19-2520 (fifteen-year
enhancement for use of knife). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was
unreasonable, Mr. Steel “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
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Here, fifty-seven-year-old Mr. Steel asserts the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends
the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment in light of the
mitigating factors, including his acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret and his
productive life since parole.
Mr. Steel has expressed great remorse for any trauma to Jessica and accepted
responsibility for his actions. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in
favor of mitigation. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). During the presentence
interview, Mr. Steel stated he felt “sick” about the offense. (Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSI”),2 p.10.) He similarly explained, “I made an incredible [sic] stupid mistake that will not
be repeated. I have lost everything that I have worked all my life to obtain.” (PSI, p.18.) He
noted no one was hurt and said, “I did not mean to threaten or scare her. I am sick with sorrow
and regret, my peers at the bar judged me. I accept that with grace.” (PSI, p.18.) He made similar
remarks at sentencing, stating, “I am deeply sorry that I have hurt anybody.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.24,
Ls.10–11.) He acknowledged, “I was drunk, and I was stupid.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.25, L.17.) He
apologized to Jessica and recognized, based on her testimony at trial, that he harmed her.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.28, Ls.7–10.) Mr. Steel’s statements of acceptance, remorse, and regret stand in
favor of mitigation.
In addition to his acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret, Mr. Steel has been a
productive member of society after his parole in 2010. In 1984, Mr. Steel was sentenced to life in
prison for murder. (PSI, p.12.) He was paroled in 2000, but absconded to Mexico. (PSI, p.12.)
He was brought to the United States by Mexican authorities in 2009, put back in custody, and

2

Citations to the PSI refer to the 42-page electronic document with the confidential exhibits.
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then paroled again in 2010. (PSI, p.12.) From 2010 on, Mr. Steel was a contributing member of
society. He has a “great” relationship with his siblings and extended family. (PSI, p.13.) His
family mostly resides in Idaho, and they would have dinner together, go camping, and go to
sporting events together. (PSI, p.13.) Mr. Steel enjoys exercising, climbing, rafting, and other
outdoor activities. (PSI, p.13.) His health, family, and friends were most important to him. (PSI,
p.18.) He was also gainfully employed. (PSI, pp.15–16.) He worked in the construction industry,
and his past employers described him as a reliable employee. (PSI, pp.15–16.) One employer
explained, “I would give him an A+,” and another said Mr. Steel was “awesome” and would
work on the weekends. (PSI, pp.15–16.) Mr. Steel’s success once on parole in 2010 is a strong
mitigating factor in favor of a lesser sentence.
In summary, Mr. Steel argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence. The nature of the offense itself, along with the mitigating factors discussed
above, did not warrant a twenty-year sentence with ten years fixed. He submits the district court
did not exercise reason in imposing this sentence. Proper consideration of the mitigating factors,
and the facts of this case, supports a lesser term of imprisonment.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Steel’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Reduction In His Fixed Time
A.

Introduction
Similar to his excessive sentence argument, Mr. Steel asserts the district court failed to

exercise reason and therefore abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction
in his fixed time.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The district court’s denial of a Rule 35 motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). Again, Mr. Steel respectfully refers this Court to
Part I.B for the three-part standard for appellate review of discretionary decisions.

C.

The District Court Did Not Exercise Reason By Denying Mr. Steel’s Rule 35 Motion To
Reduce His Fixed Time In Light Of His Additional Letters Of Support
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed

to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the entire record and
apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The
Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett,
134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce
a sentence under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce.” State v.
Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007).
Here, Mr. Steel argues the additional information provided with his Rule 35 motion
showed his sentence was excessive. Family support and letters of good character stand in favor
of mitigation. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594–95 (family support and good character as mitigation);
see State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App. 2010) (district court considered family and
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friend support as mitigating circumstance). Mr. Steel added four letters to shed light on his
character and supportive family. First, one of Mr. Steel’s nephews described Mr. Steel’s role in
his life. (Aug. R., pp.4–5.) He wrote Mr. Steel was kind, generous, and thoughtful towards him.
(Aug. R., pp.4–5.) His nephew hoped to spend more time with him, and he did not want to “wait
20 years to spend time with him again.” (Aug. R., p.5.) Second, another nephew wrote Mr. Steel
was “always warm” to him and his brothers. (Aug. R., p.6.) This nephew acknowledged
Mr. Steel had made some mistakes, and the family “didn’t know him or what to expect” when he
was released from prison. (Aug. R., p.6.) But, since Mr. Steel’s release, his nephew stated he was
“a great uncle” and “working hard to get his life together and to rebuild it.” (Aug. R., p.6.) His
nephew noted the family supported Mr. Steel. (Aug. R., p.6.) Third, Mr. Steel’s brother-in-law
recognized Mr. Steel’s “bad choices,” but explained that he obtained employment in construction
and “lived a good life, lives with in [sic] his means, is debt free, always has a job that he enjoys
and is dependable.” (Aug. R., p.7.) His brother-in-law wrote:
I don’t know the details of his case. I know he is a good man and I hate to see him
live the last years of his life in prison. I hope that he gets a just sentence that is
reasonable so he can go back to living a life where he can take care of himself and
be back with family.
(Aug. R., p.7.) Fourth, and finally, another nephew wrote he was sad once he learned Mr. Steel
would be returning to prison. (Aug. R., p.8.) His nephew stated, “I was finally able to get to
know my uncle and see that he is a good person.” (Aug. R., p.8.) He described Mr. Steel as
grateful and a “loving” member of the family. (Aug. R., p.8.) He also explained Mr. Steel’s
father died over one year ago, and he believed that contributed to Mr. Steel’s recent behavior.
(Aug. R., p.8.) He asked for some leniency in his uncle’s sentence. (Aug. R., p.8.)
In light of this additional information of family support and good character, Mr. Steel
asserts the district court did not exercise reason when it denied his Rule 35 motion for a
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reduction in his fixed time. The district court determined this additional information did not
justify a reduction in his sentence. (Aug. R., p.11.) Mr. Steel disagrees and argues the district
court did not adequately weigh this additional mitigating information. Proper consideration of
this information supports a reduction in his fixed time to eight years.

CONCLUSION
For the evidentiary error, Mr. Steel respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment
of conviction and remand his case for a new trial. For the sentencing errors, he respectfully
requests this Court reduce his sentence or, in the alternative, vacate his judgment of conviction
or the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion and remand his case for a new sentencing or
Rule 35 motion hearing.
DATED this 21st day of February, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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